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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST RIVER CROSSINGS IS VOID. 
Arbogast wrongly contends that River Crossings cannot appeal the district court's 
denial of its Rule 60(b) motion on the basis that the default judgment was void for lack of 
jurisdiction because it constitutes an attack on the default judgment itself (Br. of 
Appellee at 15.) This Court has already directly ruled that River Crossings' appeal of the 
order denying River Crossings' Rule 60(b) motion was timely. (See Ruling attached as 
Exhibit A.) One of the reasons expressly set forth in Rule 60(b) as proper grounds for 
setting aside a default judgment is that the judgment was "void.v Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(4). 
As explained in detail in River Crossings' opening brief, the default judgment at 
issue in this case was void because Arbogast failed to notify River Crossings of the 
default proceedings through service of the default documents it filed as required by Rule 
5(a). Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(B). River Crossings' lack of notice of the default 
proceedings was at the very core of its Rule 60(b) motion and the central issue in this 
appeal. It goes without saying that the legal effect of lack of notice is lack of jurisdiction 
and a void judgment. Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 881 n.2 (Utah 1981). 
Moreover, regardless of whether it was directly addressed below, "a lack of 
jurisdiction can be raised by the court or either party at any time." A.J. Mackay Co. v. 
Okland Constr. Co.. 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991). The district court never had the 
chance to consider the legal effect of lack of notice on the court's jurisdiction because it 
incorrectly concluded that River Crossings had sufficient notice. If this Court concludes 
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that Arbogast failed to serve River Crossings with documents filed with the Court 
concerning the default, or that River Crossings lacked proper notice of the default 
proceedings as required by Rule 5(a), then it must find that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter default judgment against River Crossings. Meyers. 632 P.2d at 881 
n.2. It further must find that the default judgment was void and that the district court 
erred in refusing to set it aside pursuant to River Crossings' timely Rule 60(b) motion. 
II. RIVER CROSSINGS' LACK OF NOTICE OF THE DEFAULT 
PROCEEDINGS WAS DIRECTLY AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
Arbogast's argument that the district court did not have the opportunity to address 
claims of lack of notice under URCP Rule 5(a) is flatly refuted by the district court's own 
language. In its order denying River Crossings' Rule 60(b) motion, the district court 
stated as follows: 
That pursuant to URCP Rule 5(a)(2), Defendant's counsel has 
not formally appeared in the instant action. Nevertheless, 
Defendant's counsel's notification and communications with 
Plaintiffs counsel constitute an appearance . . . . 
(R. at. 120) (emphasis added). The district court not only considered River Crossings' 
notice claims within the context of Rule 5(a)(2), but in fact held that River Crossings was 
entitled to notice under Rule 5(a)(2). River Crossings' appeal of the district court's order 
on the grounds that Arbogast failed to comply with Rule 5(a)(2) is therefore entirely 
proper. 
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The transcript excerpts cited by Arbogast as evidence that River Crossings 
conceded that Rule 5(a)(2) did not apply are vague and irrelevant.1 Statements by 
counsel regarding conclusions of law are not binding on River Crossings or the courts. In 
re Hansen's Estate. 184 P. 197, 203 (Utah 1919). ("[W]e think this was but an admission 
of a legal conclusion and is binding neither upon appellant nor upon the court. It is the 
duty of the court to declare the law as it exists, regardless of what a party or his counsel 
may concede to be the law.5*) On appeal, conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, regardless of counsels* mistaken assumptions as to matters of law. Lund v. 
Brown. 2000 UT 75 1fl] 8, 12, 11 P.3d 277. This is particularly pertinent in this case 
given that the "Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are not a model of clarity in explaining 
notice requirements to parties in default." Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75 ^ 21. 
Furthermore, River Crossings tirelessly raised the issue of lack of notice of the 
default proceedings at every stage in this litigation. In its Rule 60(b) Motion, River 
Crossings repeatedly declared that it thought it was entitled to notice prior to default 
under Utah law and that no notice was given. (R. at 53, 54. 55.) River Crossings' Reply 
Memorandum is likewise replete with claims of lack of notice. (R. at 97, 99, 101.) River 
Crossings raised and preserved this issue for appeal, regardless of whether it cited to the 
1
 Although not reflected in the transcript itself, the two sentences immediately preceding 
the materia] quoted by Arbogast are actually quotes from Interstate Excavating. Inc. v. 
Agla Development, 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), the case cited by River Crossings' counsel 
at the hearing. (Tr. at 24.) With that context in mind, it is unclear whether the statements 
of River Crossings' counsel quoted by Arbogast are a reference to the Interstate case or to 
the present matter. 
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specific legal authority best supporting its entitlement to notice. To suggest that the 
district court was somehow blindsided by this issue is both incorrect and unfair. 
III. RIVER CROSSINGS' APPEARANCE ENTITLED IT TO SERVICE OF 
ALL PLEADINGS UNDER RULE 5(a)(2). 
A. River Crossings Made an Appearance in the Case. 
The district court correctly concluded that "Defendant's counsel's notification and 
communications with Plaintiffs counsel constitute an appearance'* under Rule 5(a)(2). 
(R. at 120.) On December 20. 2005. Arbogast's counsel. Chad Utley, received a letter 
from the Nevada firm of Black Lobello & Sparks, informing him that River Crossings 
had retained its legal services. (R. at 118.) From the time Arbogast filed its Complaint, 
Mr. Utley was engaged in ongoing communication with River Crossings' counsel. (R. at 
58.) Mr. Utley granted at least two extensions to file a responsive pleading to River 
Crossings' counsel. (R. at 88-89. 118.) River Crossings' counsel participated in 
extended settlement negotiations with Mr. Utley from December 20, 2005 through at 
least June 29, 2006. (R. at 91, 118-19.) 
Although Arbogast does not dispute these facts, it takes issue with the district 
courf s conclusion that River Crossings' actions constituted an appearance under Rule 
5(a)(2)(B). Arbogast contends that only a party making a "formal appearance," however 
that may be defined, is entitled to service under the Rule. This is simply not correct. No 
basis whatsoever exists in the plain language of Rule 5(a)(2)(B) for any distinction 
between a "formal" or "informal" appearance. The Rule simply provides that only a 
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"failure to appear** exempts the opposing party from the service requirements of Rule 
5(a)(2). 
Although courts in Utah and other jurisdictions have used the phrase "formal 
appearance*' to describe an appearance made by filing a pleading or appearing before the 
court. Arbogast has not cited to any case law supporting its proposition that only such a 
"formal appearance" brings a party within the scope of Rule 5(a)(2)(B). To the contrary. 
courts interpreting the language of the Rule's federal counterpart, Rule 5(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, have directly held that an appearance for purposes of Rule 5(a) 
is "not confined to physical appearances in court or the actual filing of a document in the 
record.** N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown. 84 F.3d 137 (5th Cir.. 1996) (internal citations 
omitted). 
Appearances include a variety of informal acts on defendant's 
part which are responsive to plaintiffs formal action in court, 
and which may be regarded as sufficient to give plaintiff a 
clear indication of defendant's intention to contest the claims. 
In summary, an appearance is an indication in some way of 
an intent to pursue a defense. This is a relatively low 
threshold. 
2
 Arbogast cites to Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, as distinguishing between a formal and 
informal appearance, but the quote cited actually only distinguishes between a party 
making an appearance and a party that "never made an appearance/* Id. at ]^ 22. 
Likewise, in Central Bank: & Trust v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah 1982), the 
defaulting party had not made any appearance in the case, whether designated as 
"formal** or "informal." 
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Id. (emphasis added) (cited in Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1144); accord Sun 
Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Savs. Assoc. 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5lh Cir. 1989); 
U.S. v. McCoy. 954 F.2d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir. 1992).3 
River Crossings' "informal acts" gave Arbogast a clear indication of its intent to 
defend against the claim through its retention of counsel, its multiple requests for 
extension of time to file a responsive pleading, and its ongoing settlement negotiations. 
Arbogast could never have been in doubt that River Crossings intended to pursue—and 
was in fact pursuing—a defense of the claim. As found by the district court, River 
Crossings' acts therefore constituted an appearance in this case for purposes of Rule 5(a). 
This application of Rule 5(a) perfectly comports with Rule 14-301(16) of the Utah 
Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, which states: "Lawyers shall not cause the 
entry of a default without first notifying other counsel whose identity is known, unless 
their clients* legitimate rights could be adversely affected.'* (Emphasis added.) This 
standard does not require a "formal appearance" as a prerequisite to providing notice of 
default but merely knowledge of the identity of opposing counsel. Arbogast admittedly 
and indisputably had such knowledge. 
The lack of distinction between formal and informal appearances for purposes of 
Rule 5(a)(2)(B) is also consistent with the policy behind the rule. "The courts, in the 
interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity for 
3
 Because the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were "fashioned after the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, [Utah courts] may look to decisions under the federal rules for 
guidance." 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72 H 64 (citing Winegar v. Slim 
Olson, Inc., 252 P.2d 205 (1953)). 
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a hearing on the merits of every case." Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 377 P.2d 189 
(Utah 1962): accord Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75 ^ 10. It is "important to keep in mind 
that the very reason for the existence of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be 
heard and to do justice between them." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. 
Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). That being said, there is no 
sound policy reason for entitling counsel who has made a "formaL appearance by merely 
filing some document concerning a complaint to notice of default while setting a trap for 
those who may have had extensive negotiations and contact with opposing counsel but 
have not yet filed a responsive pleading. 
To the extent that Utah case law were to suggest a distinction between a formal 
and informal appearance for purposes of service under Rule 5(a)(2)(B)—which it does 
not—it would do so in violation of well-settled rules of construction: 
[I]n construing any statute, "we first examine the statute's 
plain language and resort to other methods of statutory 
interpretation only if the language is ambiguous." 
Accordingly, we read the words of a statute literally unless 
such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable, and 
give the words their usual and accepted meaning. Third, the 
reviewing court does not look beyond the plain and 
unambiguous language to ascertain legislative intent. Finally, 
we presume that the "statute is valid and that the words and 
phrases used were chosen carefully and advisedly. 
Salt Lake County Bd. of Equal, v. Tax Common. 2004 UT App 472; 106 P.3d 182 
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Because nothing in the plain language of 
Rule 5(a)(2)(B) makes any distinction whatsoever between so-called formal versus 
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informal appearances for purposes of service under Rule 5(a)(2)(B), the courts must 
interpret the Rule accordingly. 
B. River Crossings Was Entitled to Service of All Pleadings. 
The district court correctly concluded that because River Crossings appeared in 
the case, it was entitled to notice of the default proceedings under Rule 5(a)(2). 
That pursuant to URCP Rule 5(a)(2), Defendant's counsel has 
not formally appeared in the instant action. Nevertheless, 
Defendant's counsel's notification and communications with 
Plaintiffs counsel constitute an appearance arid there was 
adequate notice was [sic] given to Defendant, pursuant to the 
June 29, 2006 letter, than an answer was required to be filed 
in response to Plaintiffs complaint. 
(R. at 120.) Despite the clear reference to Rule 5(a)(2) and the court's discussion of the 
appearance requirement in that context, Arbogast strangely suggests that the district court 
merely held that River Crossings' appearance entitled it to notice of default—but not 
pursuant to Rule 5(a)(2). What Arbogast fails to elaborate upon is which rule or statute 
might possibly entitle River Crossings to notice of default if not Rule 5(a)(2). 
Clearly, the district court concluded that River Crossings' appearance entitled it to 
notice of default pursuant to Rule 5(a)(2). However, River Crossings' appearance 
entitled it not merely to notice of the default proceedings, which it did not receive, but 
more specifically to "be served with all pleadings and papers." Utah R. Civ. P. 
5(a)(2)(B). It is undisputed that Arbogast did not serve River Crossings with the Default 
Certificate, which it filed with the district court on July 31, 2006 (R. at 32), nor with its 
request for Default Judgment, which it filed on August 11, 2006 (R. at 35). As a direct 
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result of Arbogasfs failure to comply with Rule 5(a)(2). default judgment was 
improperly and unfairly entered against River Crossings. 
The district court apparently considered it unimportant that Arbogast had failed to 
comply with the plain language of Rule 5(a)(2) in obtaining its default judgment against 
River Crossings and instead concluded that the June 29, 2006 Letter sent by Arbogast 
satisfied the unambiguous demands of service under Rule 5(a)(2). Arbogast adopts this 
argument, stating in its brief that it satisfied Rule 5(a)(2) by mailing the June 29 Letter. 
(Br. of Appellee at 25.) In reality, this Letter merely requested the filing of a responsive 
pleading, did not even mention the word "default," and can in no way be found to be a 
substitute for service under the Rule of the documents filed with the district court to 
obtain the default judgment. 
Arbogast curiously characterizes the Letter as effectively saying, "If you don't file 
within 20 days we are going to default you." (Br. of Appellee at 40.) But the whole 
point is that the Letter did not say that—and in light of Mr. Utley's prior assurances that 
he would not file for default without notifying River Crossings, opposing counsel simply 
did not understand this Letter to communicate that message. Furthermore, the Letter was 
sent one month before Arbogast initiated default proceedings against Rjver Crossings— 
certainly not an adequate substitute for actual service of the Default Certificate and 
request for Default Judgment on River Crossings. 
Arbogast failed to act in accordance with the service requirements of Rule 5(a)(2) 
with regard to the default proceedings, depriving River Crossings of the notice to which it 
was entitled. There is nothing in the June 29 Letter that alters that fact. 
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IV. RIVER CROSSINGS PRESENTED A REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION 
FOR FAILING TO FILE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING. 
Arbogast has conceded that River Crossings' Rule 60(b) motion was timely filed 
and presented meritorious defenses. (Br. of Appellee at 36.) The sole issue in dispute 
then is whether River Crossings demonstrated a reasonable justification or excuse for its 
failure to file a responsive pleading. It clearly did. 
First. River Crossings reasonably, and correctly, believed that default could not be 
entered against it without notice from Arbogast. As set forth in detail above, had 
Arbogast complied with the requirements of Rule 5(a)(2) by serving the default 
certificate and request for default judgment, the default judgment would not, and could 
not, have been taken against River Crossings. 
Even if River Crossings had been mistaken in its belief that notice was required, it 
would still be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b)(1) expressly provides that a 
judgment may be aside set aside if it is the result of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect.'" Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) (emphasis added). Although Arbogast 
expressly acknowledges that any of these factors is grounds for relief under Rule 
60(b)(1). it focuses its discussion solely on the "excusable neglect" prong and its alleged 
requirement of due diligence. (Br. of Appellee at 28.) Contrary to Arbogast's belabored 
argument, due diligence is not a requirement for each of the Rule 60(b)(1) factors. 
In reality, the definition of reasonable justification under Rule 60(b) is much 
broader than that. As the Utah Supreme Court held in Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, a 
"good faith, legitimate belief that no action would or could be taken . . . constitutes a 
611 371952v2 10 
'reasonable justification or excuse* for the failure to reply."* Lund at ^ 19. Movants need 
not "show that their interpretation of [the] law is legally correct, but merely that they 
possessed a reasonable good faith belief* in their interpretation, kf at j^ 16. 
Such was precisely the case at hand. Based on Mr. Utley's express representations 
that he would not initiate default proceedings against River Crossings without first 
notifying opposing counsel. River Crossings reasonably and justifiably believed that no 
action would be taken against it without such notice. (R. at 96-97.) Mr. Utley has 
admitted that he made such a representation. (Br. of Appellee at 34.) 
River Crossings also reasonably believed that settlement negotiations were 
ongoing. (R. at 50 ^ | 16. 102.) As evidence of its good faith belief that settlement 
negotiations were continuing. River Crossings submitted a copy of an email message 
from River Crossings to Arbogast. (R. at 50 ^ 16, 59, 102.) This email showed on its 
face that it was sent from Mike Chernine to Rod Arbogast on Tuesday, July 25. 2006 at 
1:47 PM. IcL 
Arbogast has never denied that it received this email. Instead, for the first time at 
the hearing on River Crossings* Rule 60(b) motion. Arbogast made an untimely motion 
to strike the email as unsupported by an affidavit. River Crossings had no opportunity to 
respond to the motion. (Tr. at 3-4.) In fact, the email was supported by an affidavit from 
River Crossings' counsel. (R. at 50 ^ 16, 59.) Additionally, Mr. Chernine was present 
at the hearing, and River Crossings proffered his testimony to support the fact that he sent 
the email message. (Tr. at 4.) The district court declined to hear Mr. Chernine's 
testimony and never ruled on the motion. (Tr. at 4-5.) 
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Instead, the district court simply ignored the email in its findings of fact, 
concluding contrary to the record that there was no communication between River 
Crossings and Arbogast after the June 29 Letter. (R. at 117. ffi] 20. 22.) River Crossings 
directly contested this finding in its opening brief. (Br. of Appellant at 19-20.) 
Arbogast responded that its counsel had directed that all communications should 
go directly to them, that the email from Chernine to Arbogasl did not comply with that 
direction, and that River Crossings failed to marshal the evidence because it did not note 
that direction. (Br. of Appellee at 38-39.) That fact, however, is simply not relevant to 
the issue of whether River Crossings reasonably believed that settlement negotiations 
were ongoing. Regardless of the propriety of Mike Chernine communicating directly with 
Rod Arbogast. the fact remains that Mr. Chernine sent the email and reasonably believed 
that settlement negotiations were continuing as a result. 
Arbogast also argues that the Court should not consider the email because River 
Crossings did not prove that Arbogast received the email. (Br of Appellant at 39.) The 
text of the email itself proves that it was sent, as does the supporting affidavit. Mr. 
Chernine offered to testify further to the fact that he sent the email but was rebuffed. 
River Crossings more than met its burden of proving that the email was sent. The burden 
therefore rested on Arbogast to prove that it wasn't received. Arbogast has never even 
denied that it received the email. 
In any event, the issue of whether Arbogast received the email is also irrelevant to 
the issue of whether River Crossings reasonably believed that settlement negotiations 
were ongoing. Regardless of whether Arbogast received the email, there is no dispute 
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that River Crossings sent the email and that it believed settlement negotiations were 
continuing. 
Because River Crossings presented reasonable justifications for failing to file a 
responsive pleading to Arbogasfs complaint, the district court abused its limited 
discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment pursuant to River Crossings* Rule 
60(b) motion. As the Utah Supreme Court has declared, "it is quite uniformly regarded 
as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is 
made to set it aside." Lund at |^ 11 (emphasis added). 
V. ARBOGAST IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS5 FEES. 
Even if Arbogast were to somehow prevail on appeal, it should not be awarded its 
attorneys' fees. The district court awarded attorneys" fees to Arbogast based on a 
provision in the Trust Deed Note which presumes to require River Crossings to "pay all 
costs and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee." (R. at 82.) 
However, this appeal does not go to the merits of Arbogasfs contractual collection 
efforts against River Crossings. Rather, it goes solely to legal questions, which Arbogast 
and the Utah Supreme Court have conceded are "not the model of clarity." Because this 
appeal does not directly relate to Arbogasfs collection efforts under the Trust Deed Note, 
it is not entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal should it prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the service requirements of Rule 5(a)(2) and the express representations of 
opposing counsel, River Crossings did not receive notice from Arbogast of its initiation 
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of default proceedings until default judgment had already been entered River Crossings 
was reasonably justified in failing to defend itself based on its good faith belief that no 
action could or would be taken against it without notice. For these reasons, the district 
court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment against River 
Crossings. 
DATED this S± day of December. 2007. 
VAN COTT. BAGLE>: CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
By: 
Scott M.Lilja 
Nicole M. Deforge 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify thai on this _J^ day of December. 2007. ] caused to be mailed. 
first-class, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY 
BRJEF OF APPELLANT, to: 
Chad .1. Utley 
Tyler T. Todd 
Farris & Utlev. PC 
189 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 2408 
St. George, UT 84771-2408 
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EXHIBIT A 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
- - 0 0 O 0 0 -
UTAH APPELLATE COUP 
JUN 1 5 2007 
Arbogast Family Trust, by and 
through Rodney J. Arbogast as 
Trustee, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
River Crossings, LLC, a Nevada 
limited liability company, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No 20070395-CA 
This case is before the court on Appellee Arbogast Family 
Trust's motion for summary disposition and request for sanctions 
It is undisputed 
timely notice of appea 
denying the motion for 
It is well-settled tha 
of the Utah Rules of C 
See Arnica Mut Ins. Co 
that Appellant River Crossings filed a 
1 measured from the entry of the order 
relief from judgment on April 18, 2007 
t an order denying relief under rule 60(b) 
I V I I Procedure is a final appealable order 
. v Schettler, 768 P 2d 950, 970 (Utah 
App. 1989) . Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction over the 
timely appeal from the 
Crossings concedes tha 
the default judgment I 
aside through a succes 
60(b) motion." Based 
denial of the rule 60(b) motion River 
t it "is not attempting to directly appeal 
tself, but merely seeking to have it set 
sful appeal of the order denying its Rule 
on the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee's motion for summary 
disposition and its request for sanctions are each denied The 
appeal shall proceed to the next procedural stage 
DATED t h i s / < ^ a v of J u n e , 2 0 0 7 . 
FOR THE COURT: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, \ 
Associate Presiding Judge 
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NICOLE M DEFORGE 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 S MAIN STE 1600 
PO BOX 45340 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0340 
CHAD J. UTLEY 
TYLER T TODD 
FARRIS & UTLEY PC 
189 N MAIN ST 
PO BOX 2 4 08 
ST GEORGE UT 84 771-24 08 
Dated this June 15, 2007. 
Deputy Cler/ ' ~ 
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